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The basic problem of environmental regulation involves the government trying to induce a 
polluter to take socially desirable actions, which ostensibly are not in the best interest of the 
polluter. But the government may not always be able to precisely control the polluter. To 
further complicate matters the government faces a complex problem of determining exactly 
what level of pollution is best for society. In reality the government faces pressures from 
consumers and polluters. 
 
There are some important lessons to gather from the analysis of current models of 
regulation. One is that there are many imperfect links between the legislature and the 
pollution-generating process. In this case regulation may be excessively costly, may result 
in considerable cheating, and may result in excessive pollution. Another lesson is that 
legislature does not necessarily act as an efficient benevolent maximizer of social well-
being. 
 
The authors intend in this paper to explain the current view of political models of 
regulation, analysing them for their complexity, and attempt to provide a reasonable 
explanation of their functioning recurring to fuzzy logics. 
 
Understanding how the browns and greens interact with the legislature and regulatory 
agencies can to some extent explain the current environmental regulations. The fuzzy 
approach, intends to allow for easier understanding of these interactions, and provide an 
answer for more effective decision making.  
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Environmental Regulation in Context 
 
For several decades, the modernization of societies has occurred at the expense of 
environmental degradation. While most countries have had for some time relatively good 
legislation to deal with “green” issues (i.e. management and preservation of natural 
resources) lack of effective institutions, priorities, and proper implementation has made this 
legislation largely ineffective (Kolstad, 2000). The problem of “brown” issues, that is 
pollution, is relatively newer and, thus, even more poorly dealt with. 
 
From an economic perspective, problems of environmental pollution arise because 
resources are not allocated in an optimal way. The market is said to fail because the costs of 
a polluting activity do not fully reflect its harmful impact on the environment. This problem 
can only be overcome by some sort of institutional solution, most frequently state 
intervention. In an ideal world, the task for policy makers is quite simple. Figure 1 shows 
the most basic textbook representation of this decision problem, where Q stands for the 
quantity of pollution emission per period, MD for marginal damages of a polluting activity, 
MC for marginal abatement costs and c for cost. Policy makers only have to choose a policy 
instrument that reduces pollution from the unrestricted level Q ˆ to an optimal level Q*, 
where MD equals MC.  
 
 
Source: Kolstad, C (2000) 
 
Figure 1 - The Efficient Level of Flow Pollution 
 
 
Unfortunately, in the world of actual policy making uncertainty about virtually any decision 
parameter has non-trivial consequences for the desirable outcome. As can be seen in Figure 
1, assuming just a different marginal cost curve MC1 immediately changes the desirable 
optimum from Q* to Q1*. This underlines the potential impact of different information on 
pollution abatement costs and the crucial importance of having at least reasonably accurate 
information on the true costs of pollution abatement. Moreover, it highlights the ability of 
each actor or group of actors that holds credible information on the costs and benefits of   4
pollution abatement to influence the shape of the environmental policy measure. This raises 
a couple of questions. Given all these difficulties, how is an actual environmental regulation 
designed? How stringent can it be and how stringent is it? What does this imply for 
technology? To answer these questions, it is necessary to explicitly consider which actors or 
groups of actors may be involved in the design of an environmental regulation, what 
objectives they pursue and to what extent these objectives can be attained. 
 
It is common knowledge that environmental degradation is often institutional in nature. 
Lack of political will, overlapping institutional mandates, limited capacity and budgets, 
inadequate environmental standards, procedures, and enforcement all contribute to a 
difficult management of environmental issues. This is so even if environmental awareness 
exists and officials understand the importance of sound environmental management. These 
concerns are echoed in European Union that identifies institutional fragility as a key barrier 
to successful environmental management. (Roediger-Schluga, 2000). 
 
Environmental policy is characterized by overly ambitious and strict environmental 
standards that cannot be realistically enforced either because countries lack the capacity to 
do so or because of pressures from the private sector. Indeed, enforcement of such strict 
standards might involve sacrificing some economic growth. 
 
However, even more troubling are the means by which the implementation of the strict 
environmental standards is pursued. While the law allows for the possibility of economic 
instruments, the primary means of implementation have been command-and-control 
instruments that have guaranteed environmental impact. 
 
Since policy makers cannot fall back upon unambiguous and generally accepted estimates 
of benefits and costs of pollution abatement, the urgency and scope of an environmental 
problem as well as possible strategies to remedy the problem are subject to a social and 
political negotiation process.   
Actually, society  has different actors   arguing in favour of different types of   
environmental interventation and having different pressure powers over political process of 
decision. The public authority and the non governamental organisations tend to favour 
interventions through comand and control policy instruments, claiming for effectiveness in 
controlling pollution; on the other hand, environmental economists tend to enhance the 
economical racionality and the implementation of market-based instruments that induce a 
racional distribution of implementation costs and better achievement of efficiency goals 
Cabugueira(2004).  
 
In order to understand the process of environmental regulation, the potential stakeholders in 
the political market of environmental regulation are depicted schematically in Figure 2. 
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Source: Roediger-Schluga, 2000 
 
Figure 2 - The political market of environmental regulation 
 
 
The core participants in this framework are politicians and bureaucrats on the supply side 
and representatives from industry (and firms) on the demand side. Environmentalists also 
demand certain kinds of environmental regulation, not being part of the core stakeholders 
since they only act as pressure groups. Demands on environmental regulation may also be 
expressed by consumer and worker groups, which are represented with a dotted line due to 
their little influence on the making of the regulation. 
 
Environmental regulation is supplied by politicians and bureaucrats. Politicians are crucial 
actors in the political market, as only they have the power to adopt binding rules for all 
other actors. It is important to emphasise that these actors need political support, either 
through votes or financial support. Since voters care about their health and the state of the 
environment, politicians will take these issues into account. However, voters also care about 
income and jobs. For this reason, politicians will supply environmental regulation subject to 
the constraint that it is not politically harmful through adverse effects on income 
distribution, employment and international competitiveness (Verbruggen, 1994).  
The bureaucrats exist because politicians need specialised knowledge and resources to 
design an environmental regulation. (Niskanen, 1994). 
 
From figure 2 it can be understood that the different interested parties on the demand side 
have different roles and importance, this is because the number of firms is smaller than the 
number of environmentalists, and still smaller than the number of consumers or workers, 
benefits from lobbying are more narrowly distributed among firms, which increases the   6
incentive to spend resources on obtaining such benefits. Moreover, individual contributions 
are more significant. Also, business firms tend to have more resources, which may render 
even substantial contributions negligible in their view. Hence, industry associations may be 
overrepresented in the political arena relative to other interest groups (Keohane et al., 
1998). 
 
There is obviously much detail missing in figure 2: although in this framework   
environmental regulation is restricted to the schemes provided by the public regulation 
process, voluntary participation of industry in the regulation process is edging forward and 
gives way to more flexible regulation structures(Cabugueira, 2004; Lévêque,1996); besides, 
lobbying is no taken into account.  Nevertheless the essence of the process is depicted there. 
The main lesson to be taken is that there are many imperfect links between the legislature 
and the pollution-generating process (which on the figure is also not taken into account).  
Since the legislature cannot physically control pollution directly, it must rely on indirect 
means to obtain its ends, and often these indirect means may be less than perfect (Kolstad, 
2000). 
 
Another lesson to be taken is that the legislature does not necessarily act as an efficient 
benevolent maximizer of social well-being, this is so because of the different interest 
groups involved in the process and their ability to enforce their position. 
 
 
Water Regulation in Portugal – An Example 
 
According to Portuguese legislation not only abstraction of water and discharge of effluents 
but all uses of the water domain are subject to licensing even when on private property. 
This concept is instrumental in supporting an integrated approach to water management. 
 
Water quality management although an essential component of water management , was 
left largely unregulated until 1990. Only when environmental problems emerged and had to 
be taken in account in the political agenda, the Ministry of Environment and Natural 
Resources was created as an independent Ministry. Until then it was simply a branch of the 
Ministry of Planning and Territorial Administration.  
At local level, the municipalities have been responsible for the operation of water supply 
and waste water systems and costs have been established in political terms that do not 
reflect the full cost of the service.  
 
The need to incorporate EU Directives in the Portuguese legal system helped to overtake 
this situation. Decree-Law (D-L) nº 74/90 - replaced later for D-L  236/98- established 
criteria and standards for the protection, conservation and improvement of water quality, 
taking into account several uses. This legal document brought into the Portuguese 
legislation most of the EU Directives related to water quality.  
 
There has been a long tradition in the Portuguese administration of river basin agencies that 
by 1993 would be replaced by an organizational structure called Regional Directorates 
(DRARN)  not corresponding to the river basins, and having relevant jurisdiction over   7
water management. Water management was performed by these Directorates together with 
other environmental activities, losing this way a specialization and emphasis on water. They 
also have had responsibilities for the implementation and enforcement of EU legislation 
within their area of jurisdiction.D-L 97/2003 carried out some institutional changes namely 
concerning the transformation of the Regional Directorates (DRAOT) although having 
quite the same  competences. D-L nº191/93 created an Institute for Water (INAG) -National 
Authority for Water in the near futur- responsible for policy making at national level, for 
the preparation of water plans and for the construction of major water structures. D-L 
189/93 created the Directorate-General for the Environment, now Environmental Institut, 
the main agency responsible for defining strategic objectives and coordinating all areas of 
environmental management, with some specific duties in the water sector besides having 
the main responsibilities in preparing national legislation according to EU Directives. D-L 
nº 379/93 also published in 1993, created a new model based on an entrepreneurial 
approach to water services and a semi-privatisation of these services. These legal 
documents promote large scale water supply and waste water treatment systems, managed 
by companies with a majority of public ownership - public owned or semiprivate companies 
- called multi-municipal systems and made possible having private companies managing 
smaller systems under a contract of concession with municipalities. The multi-municipal 
systems could also operate under a contract of concession with central government.  
 
In 1994 some other legislation on water planning and management was established to 
complement and counterbalance these reforms- Decree-Law nº 45/94 requiring the 
preparation of 15 River Basin Plans and a National Water Plan as well as the 
implementation of the corresponding 15 River Basin Councils and a National Water 
Council; D-L nº 46/94 establishing new licensing regime and reinforcement of DRARN  
and Institute for Water powers and D-L nº 47/94 implementing the user-pays-principle and 
polluter-pays principle for all licensed uses of water. These uses are subject to the payment 
of a tax directly proportional to the amount of water that is used, to the scarcity of water at 
the specific location and to the economic value of the water for each specific sector and 
inversely proportional to water availability. The goal was that these principles could be 
gradually introduced to become fully operational by 1999 for domestic and industrial uses 
and by 2004 for irrigation withdrawals. In fact the procedures for computing the amount of 
these taxes and the parameters to be included in its calculation were not entirely established 
yet besides the implementation of river basin plans and the future sustainability of the water 
systems that were being built on the basis of public investment and EU funds.  
 
This legislation aimed to bring some legal stability to the water sector on all uses of the 
public water domain. In December 1994 the D–L nº 319/94 established the guidelines and 
the general framework for the contracts of concession of the public or semi-private multi-
municipal systems. This is considered an important issue because it establishes a model that 
can be followed by municipalities in their contracts with private companies, although it 
does not apply directly to these contracts.  
 
These legal documents constituted a step towards the regulation of water market, 
transferring some of the responsibilities attributed before to the public authorities, to the 
civil authority, thus increasing the level of private companies participation. This is intended   8
to contribute to improve the quality of the service and to increasing the investment capacity 
of the water sector. Indeed, the partial privatization of the water industry has brought the 
highly subsidized prices of water closed to more realistic values, although problems of 
equity can arise in a context of an essential good that is water. 
 
The implementation of these principles would be very important for guarantee of a 
sustainable use of water systems that are being built on the basis of public investment, 
strongly reinforced by EU funds. 
 
Environmental legislation is supplied by politicians and bureaucrats and in democracies, 
voters can express their care about their health, their income, their jobs and the state of the 
environment, which brings politicians concerned about these issues. These agents will 
supply environmental regulation subject to the constraint that it has not adverse effects on 
these subjects (Verbruggen, 1994). 
 
This is the core issue why the complexity is not in the task of incorporating the EU 
Directives in national legislation, but in the effective enforcement of this legislation. 
The idea was that major uses could be paying appropriate taxes, but actually it has been a 
virtual goal. 
 Besides the voting process, there are some other reasons that can be pointed out as a cause 
for the difficulties quoted. It is very difficult to enforce the legislation concerning licensing 
and paying taxes because there is a well established tradition of free water appropriation 
and because enforcement requires an efficient administration, which is very far from the 
current situation. The registration of all users is indeed an enormous task. 
 Portugal still has lack of satisfactory infrastructures and connection of houses to these 
systems, although the impressive evolution in these field in recent years. Old industrial 
units are related with the most serious problems of industrial pollution because many of 
them don’t have clean technologies (Sereno, 2002).Control and monitoring of water quality 
in rivers and coastal waters is also a problem, as there are some institutional deadlocks. This 
is because of the severe cuts in budget and human resources due to the Stability Agreement 
in EU. Agriculture related pollution is also a problem with difficult resolution, as farmers 
attitudes and practices are far from environmental friendly. Investment effort and other non-
structural measures as adequate principles to ensure a long term sustainability of the system 
are needed for the development of backstage technical capabilities and adequate planning 
procedures. 
 
At the local level, municipalities although sharing responsibilities in defining water policies 
and applying national legislation, tend to concentrate on the problems of water supply and 
waste water disposal, as they are the responsible entities for these jobs. They have an 
important role in public health as supervisors of the quality of drinking water.  
 
The residential distribution of water and the small systems serving one or a small number of 
municipalities remain the responsibility of municipalities which may subcontract private 
companies as said before. 
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All Portuguese legislation up to this time concerning water sector regulation had a relevant 
impact on the institutional framework for water planning and management. For the first 
time river basin planning becomes a legal obligation, the water services could be operated 
in a more professional manner and the use of water services could correspond to a financial 
compensation. The problem is that only theoretically one does can consider so. 
 
Over the last years, the traditional sectoral approach to environmental protection was 
abandoned, primarily influenced by the concept of sustainable development. The key 
strategy is to integrate the environment into other policy areas, as a driving force for a 
rationale and a sustainable use of natural resources and to avoid depletion, and price has a 
determinant role in environmental policies. A comprehensive integration is the goal of EU 
policies itself as they promote the adoption of integrated strategies.  
 
The main objective of EU concerning water policies is well established in COM, (2000) 
where it is clear that the development of water pricing policies enhancing the sustainability 
of water resources is crucial. The idea is that the full recovery of financial costs and the 
integration of environmental concerns are the favorite way to use efficiently water. 
 
European Water Framework Directive (Directive 2000/60/CE) includes for the first time 
and in a explicit way, economic concepts in water management and although being very 
flexible about specific methodologies of implementation in each member state, it gives a 
special importance to the economic analysis of the water sector. So although each member 
state can adapt the principles concerning this matter to their own law, they have to try to 
comply with the idea of Polluters Pay Principle and full cost recovery of water services.  
The guiding document for the implementation of the Water Directive in what concerns 
water economics (WATECO, 2002)  reinforces the importance of these economic aspects in 
order to achieve the environmental goals and further studies(Palma,2002, Gonçalves and 
West) have been carried out to analyse the implementation of  economic analysis of the 
Portuguese water sector. 
 
At the moment the Portuguese government is about to approve the Water Law, which 
intends to be the transposition of the Water Directive and which has given rise to much 
controversy as it seems to reinforce clearly the lobby of the water industry besides other 
limitations whether of  conceptual or methodological nature(Sereno, 2002; Aguapública, 
2004;Tovar 2004;CNA 2004). 
 
This Water Law set up two principles: The compulsory nature of the economic analysis of 
water uses in each  hydrographic region and the cost recovery principle in what concerns 
water services, including environmental and  economic costs.This principle is to be 
considered in Portuguese water pricing policy until 2010.  
 
Pricing water is the way to recovery costs and to incentive racionality in water usages and 
water markets are seen as the better way to achieve environmental goals. INAG, the futur 
NationalWater Authority and DRAOT will have strong competences in what concerns 
water conservation in quantity and quality, and a new institution is created, named   
Hidrographic Region Administration - ARH with responsabilities (among others) in setting   10
the charges. Three kind of charges are set up in the Water Law: Environmental charges are 
due to the activities that have a negative impact on the water quality (negative 
externalities); user charges are due for the private usage of the water public domain; the 
regulation charge is applicable to the infrastructures beneficiaries. Futur regulamentation of 
the Law will establish the framework of these charges. 
 
 
Fuzzy Concepts Applied to Environmental Regulation 
 
Fuzzy logic is an intuitively compelling technology that actually enhances computer 
intelligence by making the computer act more human. Whereas most computers are limited 
to strict binary programming (yes/no and true/false) much like standardized tests, fuzzy 
logic seeks to round the edges of hard logic data. The appeal of fuzzy logic for different 
subjects is that there are very few times in real life when problems have completely black-
or-white solutions, and numerical data are not possible to ascertain. Commonly it can be 
said that fuzzy logic deals in shades of grey.  
 
In 1951 a professor of electrical engineering at Columbia University, wrote a paper called 
“System theory”, which founded a new discipline of measuring hard data. However, Zadeh, 
in his studies of complex systems, found that human interactions in organizations defy 
predictable behaviours and, therefore, hard data are not always possible or accurate in 
tracking processes. By 1962, Zadeh (quoted in Abbott, 1996) concluded that individuals 
reason in fuzzy terms. 
 
Fuzzy logic has great applicability to a very wide range of subjects, and from reviewing 
literature it can be seen this term applied to subjects as learning organizations, leadership, 
neural networks, etc. This is because there is the urgent need to search creative methods of 
measurement. Most of the issues raised in these topics are led by human beings, not 
numbers! While hard logic data are important in giving feedback on the success of 
processes, it is the human resource that gives meaning to the numbers. The authors are 
interested in fuzzy logic because they can see the benefit of applying its principles in order 
to explain and helping with the environmental regulation process.   
 
In many instances where hard logic ends is where fuzzy logic begins. Measuring and 
understanding the relationships between the different interested parties the regulation 
process is elusive, inexact and fuzzy. 
 
 
The Fuzzy Approach to the Water Regulation Model 
 
Let’s go back to figure 2, and consider the following question what type of regulation will 
the different interest groups demand? 
 
Environmentalists will demand stringent, highly visible regulation to help them to raise 
their public profile. Should consumer groups and worker organisations be involved? In that   11
case they will demand that the environmental regulation does not raise the prices of the 
goods they consume or hurt their members jobs and income, respectively.  
 
Firms will demand regulation that does not harm their competitiveness. Thus, they will 
attempt to minimise compliance costs and avoid costly interruptions of standard operating 
procedures that stringent environmental regulation might entail. Moreover, at least some 
firms may attempt to benefit from environmental regulation either by creating markets for 
their products or by obtaining monopoly rents through a restriction of competition (Stigler, 
1972).  
 
Accordingly, producers of 'green' products, technologies or services may try to utilise the 
regulatory framework to promote their output and win market shares from their 'dirty' 
rivals. Also, domestic firms may attempt to employ environmental regulation as a non-tariff 
trade barrier against their foreign rivals. In the same vein, technologically advanced firms 
may attempt to use stringent regulation to drive their less advanced rivals out of the market. 
In all these cases, some firms may actually favour stringent regulation, signalling to policy 
makers that the costs of compliance are low. 
 
All of these issues raised are fuzzy in nature. This is an explanation of why is so difficult to 
enforce regulations imposed by governments. 
 




















Figure 3 – The Water Regulation Model in Portugal 
 
The shaded areas in the model represent economic instruments. The standards of water 


















Groups   12
In figure 3 it is also represented the government and bureaucrats and the different interest 
groups (please refer to figure 2).  
 
In order to apply the fuzzy concepts we need to understand that any negotiation process 
between government and interest groups is characterised by an information set, which will 
allow establishing criteria upon which can be taken rational decisions. 
 
Due to the existent conflicts amongst the interest groups, the authors think that the use of 















Figure 4 – Conflicts of Interest Arrow 
 
On the environmental side, the interest groups will require strong legislation in order to 
protect the environment, without taken any consideration for the economics. On the other 
hand, industry will require that legislation will not be a burden to their productive process, 
and hence, doesn’t jeopardize their profit share.  
 
These are two opponent views, and government will bounce back from one to the other, 
according to the current political agenda. 
 
In order to became more sustainable what is needed is a compromise between the different 
extremes towards an equilibrium – we need to shorten the arrow (see figure 4). 
 
How can we then apply the fuzzy concepts in order to achieve this compromise? First of all 
it is needed to define a set of feasible and relevant alternatives. Let’s take the example of 
user charge (from the Portuguese water regulation model). 
 
Relevant alternatives: 
1.Implemented by the government (A1) 
2.Private implementation with government regulation(A2) 
3.Private management only (A3) 
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These alternatives are to be judged on the basis of various evaluation criteria. For this 
purpose we will use the sustainability pillars (economic, social and environmental). 
 
Economic criteria: 
1.Impact on water cost recovery (C1) 











It appears that concerning the information of the diverse impacts on the regulation process 
of the user charge, the degree of uncertainty is high, so that quantitative information on 
these impacts is not often available. Hence, the representation of such impacts in fuzzy 
terms seems very appropriate. 
 
A multi-criteria fuzzy evaluation matrix is presented below. 
 
Table 1 – Evaluation Matrix for a Fuzzy Water Model Problem 
 
CRITERIA   
ALTERNATIVES  C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 
A1 Bad  Excellent  Moderate  Moderate  Bad  Bad 
A2 Moderate  Moderate  Good  Good  Good  Moderate 
A3  Excellent Bad  Moderate Moderate Excellent Excellent 
 
The rationale beneath this matrix is that the price goes up without State intervention, and 
this will have a bad, moderate, good or excellent impact on the different criteria under 
analysis. 
 
In addition to this fuzzy evaluation matrix, an assessment of the priority structures of the 
diverse interest groups is required. For the purpose of this analysis, the following interest 
groups are considered: 
 
1.Industry (I1) 
2.Water Industry (I2) 
3.Consumer Groups (I3) 
4.Environmental Pressure Groups (I4) 
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In Table 2, is presented the linguistic evaluations of the alternative plans according to each 
interest group presented. 
 
These evaluations were assessed based upon theoretical knowledge. To further study this 
matter, it is necessary to undertake more precise evaluations based upon surveys and 





Table 2 – Fuzzy Evaluations of Alternatives According to each Interest Group 
 
INTEREST GROUPS   
ALTERNATIVES  I1  I2 I3 I4 
A1 Good  Bad  Good  Excellent 
A2 Excellent  Good  Excellent  Good 
A3 Bad  Excellent  Bad  Bad 
 
By applying fuzzy multi-criteria procedure for each pair of actions (A1, A2; A1, A3; A2, 
A3) it is possible to obtain different degrees of truth (for example comparing in terms of 
better, indifferent or worse). 
 
From the analysis of the tables above, it can be pointed out some interesting conclusions: 
 
-Privatising the water market without State intervention (A3) would mean that the price 
would reflect all costs involved; 
-This would be “excellent” for C1, C5 and C6, respectively, cost recovery, water 
quality, and eco-system equilibrium. This is because if the price goes up, then 
quality increases as the demand of water will be rationalised; 
-It is also interesting to see that from the analysis of table 2, it can be seen that is spite 
of water quality increase with privatisation (A3), the environmental pressure groups 
(I4) prefer public provision. 
-For the water industry is clearly advantageous to completely privatise the water sector, 
as this would create a producer surplus, since they usually work under a context of 
natural monopoly; 
-For other interest groups under analysis, their interest seem to run in parallel, as their 
interest is mainly related to cost and few considerations on the environment. 
 
It is important to note that in case of “direct conflict of goals” game-theory elements such 
as the notion of “power” need to be considered. Furthermore, attributing to the same 
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Conclusions and Further Research 
 
The authors intended with this paper to present an empirical model of water regulation 
using theoretical principles of fuzzy logics. By no means, did this work intended to be an 
extensive description of a real world application model. 
 
This method is intended to provide help for decision-makers to find out which alternatives 
are most attractive given their preference structure, although, this will depend amongst 
others of their relative power and decision rules and practice. In the Portuguese example, it 
is known of the difficulty of implementing and enforcing environmental procedures. 
 
The authors are researching this method as an effective tool for evaluation problems with 
conflicting objectives such as the environmental regulation process. 
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